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Impaired goal-directed behavioural control
in human impulsivity
Lee Hogarth, Henry W. Chase, and Kathleen Baess
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Two dissociable learning processes underlie instrumental behaviour. Whereas goal-directed behaviour
is controlled by knowledge of the consequences, habitual behaviour is elicited directly by antecedent
Pavlovian stimuli without knowledge of the consequences. Predominance of habitual control is
thought to underlie psychopathological conditions associated with corticostriatal abnormalities,
such as impulsivity and drug dependence. To explore this claim, smokers were assessed for nicotine
dependence, impulsivity, and capacity for goal-directed control over instrumental performance in
an outcome devaluation procedure. Reduced goal-directed control was selectively associated with
the Motor Impulsivity factor of Barrett’s Impulsivity Scale (BIS), which reflects propensity for
action without thought. These data support the claim that human impulsivity is marked by impaired
use of causal knowledge to make adaptive decisions. The predominance of habit learning may play a
role in psychopathological conditions that are associated with trait impulsivity.
Keywords: Outcome specific devaluation; Goal-directed learning; Habit; Drug dependence; Nicotine;
Impulsivity.
Animal behavioural neuroscience has identified
two dissociable learning processes underlying
instrumental behaviour (Dickinson & Balleine,
2010). Goal-directed, or intentional, instrumental
behaviour is mediated by explicit knowledge of the
instrumental contingency between response (R)
and receipt of the outcome (O; intention), com-
bined with knowledge of the incentive value of
the O (desire), which provides evaluative feedback
to determine the propensity to perform the R. By
contrast, habitual instrumental behaviour comes
under the direct control of stimuli (S) in which
the response (R) has been previously reinforced,
through classic S–R/reinforcement learning.
Thus, whereas goal-directed behaviour is
mediated by knowledge of the outcome, such
knowledge plays no role in habitual behaviour
because the S, when reencountered, elicits the R
directly.
The revaluation procedure is the accepted
method for determining the goal-directed or
habitual status of an instrumental response. In a
commonly employed animal revaluation design,
rats first learn two instrumental responses for dis-
tinct outcomes (such as pellets and sucrose), before
one outcome is devalued by specific satiety or taste
aversion conditioning in a separate context. In
the test phase that follows, rats again have the
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opportunity to perform the two instrumental
responses, but this time in extinction—that is,
where the two responses are no longer effective
in producing their respective outcomes. A selective
reduction of responding for the devalued outcome
is interpreted as evidence that the response is goal
directed in the sense of being controlled by knowl-
edge of the R–O contingencies established in
training combined with knowledge of the current
low incentive value of the devalued outcome. By
contrast, equivalent responding for the devalued
and nondevalued outcome indicates that these
responses have become autonomous of the
current incentive value of the outcomes—that is,
they have become S–R habits elicited directly by
the instrumental context without knowledge of
their consequences.
This dual-process theory of instrumental learn-
ing is supported by behavioural dissociation
studies. These studies have found that whereas
habit learning is favoured by conditions in which
a single response–outcome contingency is over-
trained (Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, &
Boakes, 1995; Holland, 2004; Kosaki &
Dickinson, 2010), where the response is proximal
to consumption in a seeking-taking chain
(Corbit & Balleine, 2003) and where the causal
contingency between the response and the
outcome is degraded (Dickinson, Nicholas, &
Adams, 1983), the opposite conditions favour
goal-directed learning. Furthermore, neural dis-
sociation studies have established that whereas
goal-directed learning is mediated by a circuit
including the prelimbic cortex and dorsomedial
striatum, habit learning is primarily mediated
by the somatosensory cortices and dorsolateral
striatum (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). Finally,
although the S–R controller may predominate in
invariant conditions, agents readily switch back
to the R–O controller when a prediction error is
encountered (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005).
The dominance of the habit learning system has
been argued to underlie individual differences in
impulsivity and associated conditions such as drug
dependence (Everitt et al., 2008). Evidence for this
claim comes from the finding that impulsivity
confers a risk factor for dependence in both
humans and animals (Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins,
& Everitt, 2008; Verdejo-Garcı´a, Lawrence, &
Clark, 2008), and both conditions are associated
with abnormalities in the corticostriatal pathways
(Biederman et al., 2008; Volkow, Fowler, Wang,
Baler, & Telang, 2009) underlying goal-directed
and habit learning (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010;
Jedynak, Uslaner, Esteban, & Robinson, 2007).
Finally, drug preexposure enhances impulsivity
(Perry & Carrol, 2008) and habit learning (Nelson
& Killcross, 2006; Nordquist et al., 2007;
Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2005). The implication is
that a preexisting habitual/impulsive trait increases
the risk of uptake and maintenance of drug use
because the individual fails to use knowledge of
adverse consequences to regulate consumption. In
turn, drug exposure exacerbates the individuals’
habitual/impulsive trait by impacting on the neural
substrates of instrumental learning, thus rendering
them more prone to develop habitual drug-seeking
behaviours. The vulnerable individuals thus enter a
vicious circle that longitudinally spirals into clinical
dependence (Everitt et al., 2008).
To explore this claim, the current study used a
human revaluation procedure to assess the relation-
ship between individual differences in goal-directed
control, impulsivity, and nicotine dependence in a
group of student smokers. Revaluation procedures
have been developed for humans to explore the
neural substrates (de Wit, Corlett, Aitken,
Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2009; Tricomi, Balleine,
& O’Doherty, 2009; Valentin, Dickinson, &
O’Doherty, 2007), developmental maturation
(Kenward, Folke, Holmberg, Johansson, &
Gredeback, 2009; Klossek, Russell, & Dickinson,
2008), and effects of conflict (de Wit, Niry,
Wariyar, Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007) and stress
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2009) on goal-directed and
habit learning. However, as far as we are aware,
this study is the first to examine the link between
goal-directed control and impulsivity in humans.
Method
Participants
Student smokers (n ¼ 64) were recruited and were
dichotomized into those who smoked every day
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(n ¼ 32) and those who smoked less than every
day of the week (n ¼ 32). This behavioural cri-
terion was employed because the early uptake
of smoking measured in this way has been pros-
pectively associated with the longitudinal perse-
veration of smoking and development of clinical
dependence and thus provides a proxy for indi-
vidual difference in vulnerability to dependence
amongst individuals who have tried the drug
(Hiroi & Scott, 2009). Gender was balanced
within each group. All participants accurately
reported knowledge of the response–outcome con-
tingencies at the end of training. A further 8 par-
ticipants were excluded and replaced who failed
to accurately report this instrumental knowledge.
Apparatus and materials
Impulsivity was measured with Version 11 of
Barratt’s Impulsivity Scale (BIS) because this
scale has been well validated as an marker for
dependence and neuropsychiatric conditions
(Stanford et al., 2009). This questionnaire con-
tains three subscales: (a) Motor Impulsivity (e.g.,
“I do things without thinking”) assesses propensity
for action without thought; (b) Nonplanning
Impulsivity (e.g., “I plan tasks carefully”) assesses
future orientation; and (c) Attentional
Impulsivity (e.g., “I don’t pay attention”) assesses
capacity for sustained attention. The median of
each subscale was used to dichotomize the
sample to establish three impulsivity criteria.
Programming was conducted in E-prime software
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) with standard
PC and monitor.
It should be noted that impulsivity is a multidi-
mensional construct, and there are many methods
for measuring this trait (Cyders, Flory, Rainer, &
Smith, 2009; Perry & Carrol, 2008; Verdejo-
Garcı´a et al., 2008; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).
We employed the BIS because this scale has
been associated with drug dependence in many
studies (Stanford et al., 2009), and we wanted to
avoid increasing the likelihood of obtaining a
false positive due to obtaining multiple indices of
impulsivity. It will be important for future work
to assess the relationship between goal-directed
control and other measures of impulsivity.
Procedure
Participants provided informed consent and their
breath carbon monoxide level (through Bedfont
Smokerlyzer). Questionnaires then established
age, gender, smoking days per week, cigarettes
smoked on smoking days, age of smoking onset,
smoking years, time of their last cigarette,
DSM–IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders–Fourth Edition; American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) nicotine depen-
dence (Donny & Dierker, 2007), cigarette depen-
dence score (Etter, Le Houezec, & Perneger,
2003), smoking urges (Brief Questionnaire of
Smoking Urges, QSU-brief; Cappelleri et al.,
2007), and substance misuse (Willner, 2000).
The study was approved by the University of
Nottingham Psychology Ethics Committee.
Concurrent choice training
The purpose of concurrent choice training was to
establish two instrumental responses, each of
which earned a distinct reward. The training
session was initiated with the following on-
screen instructions: “This is a game in which you
can win chocolate bars and bottles of water. In each
trial, press the D or H key to try and win these
rewards. You will only win on some trials. Press the
space bar to begin.” Participants were informed
verbally at this stage that they would not get to
keep the rewards they earned during the task.
Each trial began with the centrally presented
text, “Select a key”, which remained until either
the D or the H key was pressed. A single response
on one key immediately replaced this text with the
outcome, “You win 14 of chocolate bar”, whereas
the other key produced the outcome, “You win 14
of a bottle of water”, accompanied by a picture of
that reward. The key–reward assignment was
counterbalanced between participants. Each key
had only a 50% chance of yielding its respective
outcome. On nonrewarded trials, the text
“You win nothing” was presented. The outcomes
(chocolate, water, nothing) were presented for
1,500 ms, followed by a random intertrial interval
between 1,000 and 2,500 ms prior to the next trial.
Training comprised five 16 trial blocks, and
each block contained two cycles of 8 trials. Each
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cycle scheduled 4 chocolate and 4 water outcomes
in random order. At the end of each block a “tota-
lizer” screen reported the quantity of each reward
type earned and instructed participants to move
whole chocolate bars or water bottles into “their”
boxes present on the table (remainders were
carried over to the next block). There were 10
each of Cadbury Dairy Milk Treatsize chocolate
bars (15 g) and Acqua Panna S.Pellegrino still
water bottles (250 ml) on the table, which partici-
pants cached in two adjacent boxes upon these
totalizer instructions.
Specific satiety
Following training, participants in each smoker
group were randomly assigned to a chocolate and
water satiety group (balancing gender). At the
start of the satiety treatment, participants were
asked to consume either eight chocolate bars or
two bottles of water, respectively, to rate the plea-
santness of each unit (chunk/sip) consumed on a
visual analogue scale, to record the number of
units consumed and the decline in palatability
across units. Beyond these instructions, partici-
pants were not compelled to consume more than
they wished, for ethical reasons, and whether
they consumed the total amount or not was not
recorded because the decline in hedonic evaluation
of the devalued commodity was deemed to be the
critical factor rather than the absolute amount con-
sumed. When participants had finished consuming
as much as possible of the reward, they reported
their desire to consume chocolate and water on a
7-point Likert scale, to estimate the effectiveness
of the satiety treatment at reducing desire for the
devalued compared to the nondevalued outcome.
The data of interest were the number of units
consumed (consumption), the decline in the
pleasantness ratings from the first to the last unit
consumed (reduction in pleasure), and the
reduction in desire for the devalued compared to
the nondevalued outcome (reduction in desire).
Extinction test
The purpose of the extinction test was to assess the
effect of the satiety treatment on choice between
the two keys in the absence of feedback from the
outcomes. Immediately following the satiety
treatment, participants were presented with the
on-screen instructions: “In this phase, you can earn
chocolate bars and bottles of water as before but you
will only be told how many you have earned at the
end of the experiment. Press the space bar to begin”.
By telling subjects that rewards were earned
despite the absence of outcome feedback, we
ensured that responding was maintained rather
than rapidly extinguished (Schwabe & Wolf,
2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2007).
The extinction test was identical to training
except that outcomes were omitted from trials
(thus each key selection simply launched the inter-
trial interval, ITI), the totalizer screen was omitted
(each block ran seamlessly into the next), and there
were 72 trials. Immediately following the test
session, participants were asked which key had pro-
duced chocolate and which had produced water in
the first part of the experiment. Participants were
included only if they accurately reported these
instrumental contingencies. Finally, participants
were paid £5 and were debriefed.
Results
Devaluation effect
Percentage choice of the chocolate key increased
linearly across the five blocks of training—50.2,
51.8, 52.3, 54.9, 55.8, respectively, F(1, 63) ¼
5.83, p , .05—but stabilized by the final two
blocks, F , 1, so the mean of the final two
blocks was treated as the baseline choice. This
baseline differed reliably from the economic
indifference value of 50%, t(63) ¼ 3.42, p , .005,
indicating that there was a 5.3% preference for
chocolate over water at baseline. However, there
was no reliable difference in baseline chocolate
choice between groups dichotomized by the three
BIS impulsivity factors, smoking status, and
satiety treatment, Fs(1, 62) , 1.51, ps . .22.
Thus, we could examine the percentage reduction
in choice of the devalued outcome in the extinction
test compared to baseline in the knowledge that
baseline choice was matched between groups.
Percentage chocolate choice showed no linear
change across six 12-trial blocks of the extinction
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test in either satiety group, Fs(1, 31) , 2.21, ps .
.05, so the overall mean was treated as the test
session. Devaluation magnitude scores were calcu-
lated by subtracting the choice of the devalued
outcome in the test phase from that at baseline,
such that positive values reflect the percentage
decrease in choice of the devalued outcome
following the satiety treatment.
Figure 1A shows that the groups dichotomized
by the median BIS motor impulsivity score (25)
differed with respect to devaluation magnitude
scores, F(1, 62) ¼ 7.96, p , .007, although the
devaluation effect of both the low, t(32) ¼ 7.03,
p , .001, and the high, t(32) ¼ 2.69, p , .05,
motor impulsive group was significantly greater
than zero, indicating that the difference was in
degree of goal-directed control. Importantly, the
group effect was significant relative to the
Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p , .01
employed to control for the inflated Type 1 error
rate due to conducting five group contrasts
(tobacco dependence status, three BIS scores,
and satiety treatment). The group effect did not
interact with satiety treatment, F , 1, indicating
that the group effect was equivalent in the two
satiety treatments. Finally, when devaluation
magnitude scores were segmented into six blocks
of testing, the group effect did not interact with
Figure 1. Mean percentage reduction in choice of the devalued outcome in the extinction test relative to baseline, in groups split by daily
smoking and the median of the three BIS impulsivity scores.
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block, nor was there a main effect of block, Fs , 1,
indicating that the group effect was stable across
test blocks and cannot be attributed to a differential
return of appetitive for the devalued outcome.
Additionally, as shown in Table 1, the high and
low BIS motor groups were matched for consump-
tion and reduction in subjective pleasure and desire
for the devalued outcome in the satiety treatment,
indicating equal effectiveness of the satiety treat-
ment at reducing the hedonic appraisal of the deva-
lued reward. Moreover, the group effect in Figure
1A remained significant when all measures listed
in Table 1 were entered separately as
covariates, Fs(1, 61) . 6.23, ps ≤ .01. Likewise,
correlations revealed an association between BIS
motor impulsivity scores and the devaluation
effect, r ¼ –.26, p , .05 (see Table 2), and this
association remained significant when partial
correlations controlled all variables listed in Table
1, rs . –.25, p ≤ .052. This analysis shows that
differential goal-directed control across levels of
motor impulsivity could not be attributed to
confounding variables reflected in questionnaire
data, including the other impulsivity subscales, or
differential experience of the satiety treatment.
By contrast, the two smoker groups did not
differ with respect to the devaluation effect, F ,
1 (Figure 1B) despite their difference in multiple
proxies of nicotine dependence shown in Table
1, and smoking days per week did not correlate
with the devaluation effect, r ¼ –.03, p ¼ .80
(see Table 2) . Moreover, Table 1 shows a positive
association between smoking days per week and
motor impulsivity, which was borne out by a cor-
relation between these scores, r ¼ .27, p , .04.
By contrast, smoking days per week did not
correlate with BIS nonplanning or attentional
impulsivity scores, rs , .09, ps . .52. Finally,
the correlation between smoking days per week
and BIS motor scores remained significant or
marginal when all variables listed in Table 1
were partialled out in partial correlations, rs .
.21, ps , .09. Thus, despite smoking days per
week being selectively associated with motor
impulsivity in this student sample, smoking days
was not itself significantly associated with the
devaluation effect.
Finally, there was no difference in devaluation
effect between groups split by the median BIS
nonplanning score (25; Figure 1C), attentional
impulsivity score (17; Figure 1D) or satiety treat-
ment, Fs(1, 62) , 1.60, ps . .21, and these two
impulsivity subscales did not correlate with the
devaluation effect (see Table 2). We conclude,
therefore, that impaired goal-directed control in
this human outcome devaluation procedure was
selectively associated with BIS motor impulsivity.
Satiety treatment
The satiety treatment reduced the desire for the
devalued compared to the nondevalued outcome
by an average of 4.2 points on the 7-point Likert
scale. This reduction in desire was greater for the
chocolate (mean ¼ 5.3, SEM ¼ 0.2) than for the
water (mean ¼ 3.2, SEM ¼ 0.4) treatment, F(1,
62) ¼ 26.62, p , .001, although both treatments
were reliably greater than zero, ts(31) . 8.90,
ps , .001, demonstrating the effectiveness of the
treatments in reducing desire for the devalued
outcome selectively. Similarly, the satiety treat-
ments reduced the pleasure rating of the first
sip/chunk consumed relative to the last by an
average of 63.7% on a visual analogue scale.
Moreover, this decline in palatability was equal
for the chocolate (mean ¼ 68.2%, SEM ¼ 4.4)
and water (mean ¼ 59.2%, SEM ¼ 4.4) treat-
ments, F(1, 62) ¼ 2.11, p ¼ .15, and the overall
mean was significantly greater than zero, t(63) ¼
20.30, p , .001, indicating that both treatments
reduced palatability of the consumed reward.
Finally, fewer chunks/sips were consumed in the
chocolate (mean ¼ 18.3, SEM ¼ 1.5) than the
water (mean ¼ 24.8, SEM ¼ 1.4) satiety treat-
ment, F(1, 62) ¼ 10.09, p , .001.
Discussion
The sample as a whole selectively reduced
responding for the devalued outcome in the
extinction test, indicating that their choice was
goal directed in the sense of being controlled by
an integration of knowledge about the R–O con-
tingencies established in training with knowledge
of the current incentive value of the Os. This
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outcome-specific devaluation effect accords with
previous demonstrations of goal-directed control
over instrumental behaviour in humans (de Wit
et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007; Kenward et al.,
2009; Klossek et al., 2008; Schwabe & Wolf,
2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2007).
The unique contribution of the current study
was the finding that the outcome-specific devalua-
tion effect was associated with BIS motor impul-
sivity; specifically, the devaluation effect was
reduced in participants who scored high in motor
impulsivity. This subscale required participants to
endorse questions about their propensity for
action without thought—for example, “I make
up my mind quickly” and “I act on the spur of
the moment”. These questions fit the intuitive
sense of the phenomenology of habit, that behav-
iour is prompted by the situation rather than
chosen following an evaluation of alternatives.
The claim that impulsive individuals are more
strongly cue driven accords with a finding by
Kirkeby and Robinson (2005) that impulsive indi-
viduals showed reduced variation in reaction times
in the Stroop task, suggesting they were more
reliably prompted by the colour cue and reflected
less about the meaning of the word than did low
impulsive individuals.
The differential devaluation effect of the high
and low motor impulsive groups could not be
attributed to potential confounding variables.
With regard to the satiety treatment, the motor
impulsive groups showed the same consumption
and reduction in the palatability and desire for
the devalued outcome, plus these scores were inef-
fective as covariates. Thus, the differential deva-
luation effect could not be explained by
differential sensitivity to the satiety treatment.
Second, the questionnaire data were ineffective
as covariates, suggesting that the differential deva-
luation effect could not be attributed to group
differences in questionnaire measures including
the other impulsivity subscales. Third, all partici-
pants included in the study accurately reported
knowledge of the R–O contingencies established
in training, at the end of the test session, so the
differential devaluation effect could not be
attributed to differences in knowledge of these
contingencies during the test period. Finally, the
differential devaluation effect remained stable
over test blocks, so could not be attributed to a
differential return of appetite for the devalued
outcome during the test period. We conclude,
therefore, that the impaired devaluation perform-
ance in the high motor impulsive group was
mediated by a relative decoupling of instrumental
choice from the explicit hedonic appraisal of the
outcomes. This decoupling may have arisen from
high impulsive participants’ regarding their instru-
mental choices as being irrelevant to their current
motivational state, or from a predominance of
habitual S–R control over choice. Either way,
this decoupling is reminiscent of the wanting–
liking distinction (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008;
Robinson & Berridge, 1993) inasmuch as action
was selected in contradiction to reduced hedonic
evaluation of the outcome.
Total BIS impulsivity scores have been associ-
ated with a variety of neuropsychiatric conditions
including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), adolescent risk taking, reduced error
processing, gambling, violent offending, neurode-
generation, and brain injury (Stanford et al.,
2009). In addition, the Motor Impulsivity subscale
in particular (compared to the other subscales) has
shown associations with cocaine use, craving, and
treatment retention (Moeller et al., 2001; see also
Leblond, Ladouceur, & Blaszczynski, 2003),
binge drinking (Carlson, Johnson, & Jacobs,
2010), major depression (Hur & Kim, 2009),
Table 2. Correlations between the devaluation effect and key
individual differences: Smoking days per week and the three
subscales of the BIS Impulsivity Questionnaire
Devaluation magnitude
r p
Smoking days per week 2.03 .80
BIS Motor 2.26 ,.05
Nonplanning 2.14 .26
Attention 2.07 .56
Note: N ¼ 64. BIS ¼ Barrett’s Impulsivity Scale. The significant
correlation between BIS motor impulsivity and devaluation
remained significant when the other three individual
differences were controlled in partial correlations (see text).
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duration of bipolar depression (Swann, Lijffijt,
Lane, Steinberg, & Moeller, 2009), mania
(Swann, Steinberg, Lijffijt, & Moeller, 2008),
suicide attempts (Dougherty et al., 2004), binge
eating disorder (Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter,
2004), as well as alterations in Wisconsin card
sorting performance (Cheung, Mitsis, &
Halperin, 2004), working memory performance
(Whitney, Jameson, & Hinson, 2004), executive
function (Spinella, 2005), and stop signal task per-
formance (Gorlyn, Keilp, Tryon, & Mann, 2005),
underactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC; Asahi, Okamoto, Okada,
Yamawaki, & Yokota, 2004) and overactivation of
the ventrolateral PFC (Goya-Maldonado et al.,
2010) in no-go trials, and overactivation of the
DLPFC in a rapid cue-matching task (Valdes
et al., 2006). Our finding that motor impulsivity
is associated with impaired goal-directed control
raises the possibility that underperformance of
the R–O controller and/or predominance of the
S–R controller may be present in all of these
neuropsychological conditions, but this remains to
be tested.
By contrast, there was no difference in the mag-
nitude of the devaluation effect between the daily
and nondaily smoker groups recruited for this
study, indicating that our proxy of tobacco depen-
dence vulnerability (smoking days per week) was
not associated with differential goal-directed
control. In explaining this null result, it is note-
worthy that adult drug dependence is typically
associated with higher BIS scores on all three sub-
scales (Stanford et al., 2009), yet in our student
sample, only one proxy for dependence level,
smoking days per week, was associated with only
the Motor Impulsivity subscale. The restrictedness
of this association compared to older/more depen-
dent drug users fits the argument that although
impulsivity is associated with the early acquisition
of drug taking, this association becomes stronger
longitudinally with the transition to clinical
dependence (Belin et al., 2008; Biederman et al.,
1997; Flory & Manuck, 2009). The implication
is that impaired goal-directed control should
have a larger effect size in older addicts, especially
those who have experienced drug-related
neuroadaptations or neurotoxicity. This proposal
could explain why psychostimulant preexposed
rats show accelerated habit learning (Nelson &
Killcross, 2006; Nordquist et al., 2007;
Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2005) whereas our more
dependent student smoker did not.
To conclude, adaptive decision making requires
that the cognitively demanding R–O controller
overrides established S–R habits when circum-
stances change. Our data suggest that human
motor impulsivity is associated with impairment
in this capacity. It seems reasonable, therefore,
that dual-process theory of instrumental learning
could make an important contribution to the
understanding of neuropsychiatric conditions of
which impulsivity is a core feature.
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